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Hemilton Fish Armstrong, Esq. Editor, Foreign Affairs 58 East 68th Street New York 21, New York

Dear Ham:

In connection with our most interesting dinner the other evening, I thought you might be interested in reading the attached article from The Harvard Law Record.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

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Allen W. Dulles Director

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# MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

The attached article from The Harvard Law Record is interesting for its highly critical reference to the reliability of intelligence. As likely future boss of Sir Dick, this doesn't bode any good.

RAJr.

Article from 7 Nov 57 Issue.

22 November 1957 (DATE)

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# Bevan Calls for Negotiation To Avoid Global Conflict

A jammed New Lecture Hall was witness Friday evening to Aneurin Beyan's remarkably successful forensic exercise in making the obvious explicit. Whether or not the Labour Party's "roving ambassador" and aspiring Foreign Minister satisfied the vocal crowd with the sufficiency of his follow-through from premise to policy became increasingly doubtful as the question period neared its untimely and unanimously (barring Moderator Schlesinger's propriety) unwanted end.

After the preliminaries, which saw Mr. Bevan express surprise over his being depicted as anti-American and

being depicted as anti-American and describe his attitude toward America as "proprietal" because "Welshmen wrote the Declaration of Independence," there began an earnest and forboding prophesy of doom if international attitudes remain changeless.

Impressions gained from his world travels gave him no optimism; rather, he thought the cold war was intensifying and that not much time was left to remedy an explosive and unprecedented situation — the imminence of total human destruction.

In a roughly syllogistic analysis, Mr. Bevan relinquished several facts which he called unchallengeable. These were:

1. Modern warfare has rendered our institutions of democracy obsolete in that the decision to use nuclear weapons will not be taken by representative assemblies either in America or anywhere else. The issues of key importance have passed by deliberative assemblies. Because of the fear of the enemy anticipating, because de-

bate over whether to war or not may well precipitate the very thing being discussed, the decision will by its very nature be made by one person with little consultation. It would be a decision based on very unreliable information of the secret service. He described this source of information as "by its nature uncheckable, gotten by bribery, wiretapping and other devious methods through channels not accessible to public scrutiny, not

verifiable and polluted." Thus, he reasoned, "the free world has lost control of its destiny and could be wiped out by a decision of which it was neither consulted nor a part. Present conditions being what they are, if the atmosphere gets much more sultry there is the possibility that the decision will be taken by a few politicians.

2. Given the above picture, Mr. Bevan asserted that "it is no longer an argument about communism, socialism or capitalism; it is an argument about the survival of the human race. We still talk," he continued, "as if the differences between capitalism and communism are so great as to transcend all other considerations. I can not see anything so stupid as harboring animosities that may destroy us all. It is insanity to carry the differences between us so far as to destroy ourselves,"

### **Function of War**

3. The techniques of war have been taking us to where we now stand—at the crossroads, he said. "The historical function of war has become irrelevant and this is a situation we aren't prepared for intellectually or emotionally. Historians have no advice for us. Lawyers have even less. Lawyers have learned to accept first principles but very rarely promulgate them. Religious leaders disagree



Aneurin Bevan Approved For Release 2003/07/29:m©lA-RDP80B01676R004000150018-5

1. "If it is a fact that the differences we must appraise the situation and invent other methods of approach. If we can't settle differences by force then we have to discuss in order to agree and for this to happen we have to meet." He denied the absence of any common ground on which the Soviet and Western worlds could negotiate. He capsuled the common factor as "the imminence of universal extinction unless we can settle our quarrels by negotiation."

5. "By this analysis," he argued, "the policies of nations are condemned . . . Against this background - the survival of the human race and the renewal of the vitality of democratic institutions - it is nonsense, he declared, "to exclude the representatives of 600,000,000 of the human race from the United Nations." He pooh-poohed some reasons for exclusion (irregularly founded? - how about the United States; killed Americans? — so did Germany, and the U. S. has wanted Germany armed since 1951).

## Emotional Attitudes

"These emotional attitudes, these patterns of behavior are far too primitive to stand up in the modern world. So terrible and grim are the consequences, the scale of the problem is so huge that the easy way out is escapism. But it must be faced and the question is whether we have the stature." It is no longer a matter of party politics, ideology or ism, he stated.

These were the thoughts which he tried to impress upon Krushchev in their recent Yalta meeting. He told the Soviet chief that the past world wars which were followed by great communist advances are no measure of future conflicts which would see both communism and capitalism go down.

This was 'Nye' Bevan's message to Americans. It repeatedly stressed only one facet of the world problem — that of cultivating a visceral realization of danger along with an attitude of negotiation, of trying to get at differences in order to mitigate or get rid of differences.

He dealt with attitudes and predispositions and not with policies and programs, for as he put it: "You must first believe in the practicability of negotiation before you get more specific.'

Hewing to this theme with persistence, he gave less than direct answers to many of the questions thrown at

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between nations can't be resolved by traditional techniques for Release 2063/07/29 Clark PP80B01676R004000150018-5

would die in a university. Queried concerning world reaction to our integration problems, he gracefully replied that "civilized people all over the world are happy at the United States attempt at integration."

# Peace at Any Price

He strongly denounced one questioner's attempt at summing his talk up as "peace at any price." "Individuals have died so that society might survive but if society itself dies then what is the sacrifice worth," he asserted. "A cause which results in extinction is no cause."

Along with official Labour Party policy, he favors suspending Britain's H-Bomb tests.

One particular question which to many seemed out of context nevertheless led to some instructive inferences. Mr. Bevan was asked whether he would guarantee the western frontiers of Poland. He gave a two-fold reply. First, he would rather guarantee the western frontier than risk fighting about it and second, he favored no shifting of political boundaries which incurred risk of genocide.

Pressed to comment on communism's avowed intention to dominate the world, he sidestepped cleanly and went on to express his belief in the occurrence of deep changes in Soviet social structure which the West should try to encourage. He gave an example: leaders are no longer deposed by judicial murder but by resignation. This, he said, shows Soviet society moving in the right direction.

Although the audience's reception was enthusiastic, there were some disappointed in Mr. Bevan's reluctance to freely discuss questions about policy or what follows "a disposition to negotiate." For others his conceptualization of the present world situation was too general and too simple. There were perhaps more alternatives to be weighed. A position which poses the challenge as "Both sides must want to negotiate" may not be as fruitful for probing the roots of the problems as the assertion in reverse "Why don't both sides want to negotiate?"

Mr. Bevan did not appear pleased by some of the crowd's reactions and questions. He referred to the former as "adolescent hisses" and the latter as if they had come directly from the headlines of the daily newspapers.

him in randproved for Release 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP80B01676R004000150018-5 for a personality assessment of Klush

chev, he likened him to some higher 11 S. executives in attitude.